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Euroizing the New Europe1  
Keynote address prepared for the conference, “Currency Options for 
Emerging Economies”, held at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, 
October 25, 2004. Particular thanks are due to Vivek Dehejia for his 
superb organizational support leading up to the conference.    
 
Economists will never agree on the success or failure of Europe’s 
common currency (Dean, 2002a).  In the mid-1990s, Milton Friedman 
famously declared, “I know of no good economist anywhere in the world 
who advocates the euro for Europe”, thereby impugning most European 
economists and many non-Europeans, including Robert Mundell. 
(Mundell’s history as a thorn in Friedman’s side dates back to the 1960s 
at the University of Chicago when Bob famously asked in a seminar 
“And Milton, do tell us why you think money is so important”, and runs 
right up to 2003 when they debated dollarization and the euro in the 
National Post, a Canadian national newspaper.)  
 
Martin Feldstein, a sober and responsible Professor at Harvard and 
Director of the National Bureau for Economic Research,  even predicted 
that the euro would lead to war. It is important to understand that the 
impetus for the euro was not economic: it was political. The euro was to 
be the jewel in the crown  of European union. We all understand that 
the motivation for European economic  union was political, but we tend 
to forget that currency union came as the culmination of the long 
journey that began in the early 1950s when the French civil servant 
Jean Monnet and the French foreign minister Robert Schuman inspired 
institutionalized economic cooperation between France and Germany in 
order to intertwine their interests so inextricably that they would never 
again go to war. In 1951 France, Germany and the Benelux countries 
                                                 
1 This talk draws in part from Dean (2004).  
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pooled their coal and steel resources, and in 1957 they formed the 
common market that has now evolved into the European Union.  
 
Western Europe has, indeed, been at peace now for the longest period in 
its history, 60 years. Some would argue that this had more to do with 
U.S. troops on European soil. But undoubtedly peace has had a lot to do 
with cross-border trade and investment. Still, an open question is 
whether trade and investment could have been pursued just as 
effectively, or perhaps more effectively, under the multilateral aegis of 
the GATT and its successor, the WTO.  In fact the European Union 
itself is now under unprecedented strain, with ten new members as of 
May 1, 2004, with a constitution that may or may not be ratified by 
national referenda, and last but not least, with a set of Maastricht-like 
criteria for adoption of the euro that are increasingly irksome to the 
EU’s four largest new members in Central Europe.   
 
Before dwelling on the euro for New Europe, consider for what they’re 
worth two mega-facts. Superficially at least, they seem to belie the 
conventional wisdom that the EU and the euro have promoted 
prosperity. The first mega-fact is that the two major Western European 
countries that never joined the EU – Norway and Switzerland – enjoy 
per capita incomes and other macroeconomic indicators dramatically 
better than the EU average.  The second mega-fact is that the three EU 
countries that opted out of the common currency – Denmark, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom – are also much more prosperous than the EU 
average: in fact they are in the top half-dozen among fifteen countries in 
the “old” EU.  
 
In short, neither members of the “old” European Union, nor members 
of the European Monetary Union, are necessarily the most prosperous 
countries in Western Europe. The fact that Britain, Denmark, Sweden 
have all prospered without the euro does not surprise most economists. 
Britain’s terms of trade and business cycles do not coincide with 
continental Europe’s. Denmark and Sweden’s are closer - moreover 
they stand to benefit more from integration with the euro-zone’s capital 
markets – but they have already achieved this by pegging their 
currencies. Of course a decisive reason for Britain’s opt-out was its brief 
but disastrous flirtation with fixing to the then-European Currency Unit 
in 1989, a flirtation that ended in 1992 with George Soros winning  a 
billion dollars from the Bank of England in a bet against the pound 
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sterling, and was soon followed by an economic upswing relative to the 
euroized Europe that continues to this day.   
 
A good part of what motivated all three countries to turn down the euro 
had been simply national pride and hubris. All three countries worry 
about sacrificing even more sovereignty to Brussels: though ironically 
while Brits worry about the imposition of regulations that could 
strangle incentives and efficiency, Swedes worry about the opposite – 
that Brussels will demand they dismantle their welfare state.   
 
The ultimate irony is that the euro has almost certainly impeded 
prosperity in Germany, which along with France was its most powerful 
proponent. To compound the irony, Germany was the prime proponent 
of the now-infamous Growth and Stability Pact that straightjackets 
fiscal policy, never mind that the common currency has already 
straightjacketed monetary policy.  This double straightjacketing has 
strangled aggregate national spending in Germany, where real growth 
has stagnated and unemployment has stuck at 10%.   
 
Meanwhile, the three largest economies that joined the euro on May 1st, 
2004 – the so-called “Visegrad” countries, Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic – will record average real GDP growth above 4% in 
2004. Projected growth for the eurozone in 2004 is only 1.5%. 
Productivity growth for the Visegrad three is running at an astounding 
9.5%, versus 2.8% for the eurozone. Of course this does not mean that 
they should stay out of the euro: in fact a condition of joining the EU is 
that they’re not allowed to stay out of the euro. But those same 
conditions allow lots of room for indecision and delay. The new 
members of the EU can delay joining so-called “ERM 2” (the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism that is prerequisite for adopting the euro), and then 
cannot exit ERM 2 until they meet a list of macroeconomic conditions 
over at least two years.  
 
A recent study by Deutsche Bank developed a cost/benefit index for 
joining the euro, and for all three Visegrad countries, the index was well 
below one. The reason is that ERM 2 conditions are seen to be too costly 
in the near term, relative to somewhat ephemeral benefits from the euro 
in the long term. In fact for more than a year now, all three countries 
have been stating publicly that they are unlikely to adopt the euro much 
before the end of this decade, if then (Box 1).  
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Conditions for adopting the euro 
 
These  conditions, the ones that the larger four of the ten new EU 
countries find so onerous, are what Brussels and Frankfurt demand for 
exit from ERM 2 and entry to the euro.  They are direct descendants of 
the conditions that the EU set down for itself at under the Maastricht 
treaty of 1991:  
 
- To join the EU, accession countries had to meet many economic criteria, the 
most basic of which was to create market economies. Before adopting the 
euro they must join ERM II and commit to maintaining exchange rates 
within +/- 15% (de jure) or +/- 2.25% (de facto) bands around a parity peg to 
the euro for at least two years. In addition,  they must have met the following 
“Maastricht criteria” during the year before they want to adopt the euro 
(i.e., at the earliest, during the second year of their period in ERM II): 
 
- Inflation and long term interest rates within 1.5% and 2% respectively of the 
three EU countries2 with the lowest inflation rates 
- Public debt at or below 60% of GDP, and budget deficits at or below 3% of 
GDP 
 
Serial Small Fixers 
 
Now the six smaller new EU countries – the three Baltic states of 
Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, the two island states of Cyprus and 
Malta, and Slovenia - have little or no problem with these criteria. 
Estonia has had a hard, currency-board fix to the euro since 1992, 
Lithuania adopted a similar currency board fix to the dollar in 1994 and 
then re-fixed to the euro in February of 2002. Latvia has long been 
pegged to the SDR within a  very narrow ,+/- 1% band. Cyprus has a 
peg to the euro that is de jure +/- 15% but de facto much narrower. 
Malta pegs to a basket that is 70% euro and the rest dollar and pound 
sterling. Slovenia runs a heavily-managed crawling band with 
pragmatic monetary, real, external and financial indicators. See Box 2.  
                                                 
2 Note that in this context “EU countries” means all 25 existing members, including all 10 new 









In short, the six smaller of new EU countries, with the exception of 
Slovenia, could be characterized as “serial small peggers”. Both their 
inflation and interest rates are already low, and they will easily meet 
those two criteria for adopting the euro.  Their deficit-to-GDP ratios are 
also comfortably low. Slovenia has relatively high inflation but can and 
will work that down by managing its exchange rate.  Slovenia 
fundamentally runs a tight ship and has the highest per capita GDP 
among the ten new members of the EU. It is small and open and ideally 
suited for a common currency. Slovenia and the five “serial small 
peggers” have all declared their intentions to adopt the euro by 2007 – 
in Estonia’s case, by 2006. 
 
Four Flakey Floaters 
 
This leaves the four “flakey large floaters”: Poland, Hungary, Czech 
Republic and Slovakia. These countries began the 1990s by pegging 
their currencies in order to stabilize their out-of-control macro-
economies: before privatization, soft budget constraints prevailed. 
Central banks were too weak to resist printing money without the 
external anchor of a currency peg. As inflation came under control, they 
gradually softened their pegs. Poland now runs a completely free float 
with inflation targeting. Hungary nominally pegs to the euro but within 
a wide, +/- 15% band, and targets inflation but less ambitiously than the 
Poles. Czech Republic also has a managed float with inflation targeting. 
Slovakia runs a managed float with hybrid targets and implicit inflation 
targeting.  
 
Currency regimes in the four flakey floaters have not always run 
smoothly. Poland saw its zloty rise rapidly due to rapid capital inflows, 
and had to choose between currency stabilization and inflation targeting 
(Dean, 2002b).  It chose the latter but is now coping with high interest 
rates and high unemployment. Hungary’s florint has been on a roller-
coaster ride; recently it has spiked but with no relief in sight for 
inflation or interest rates. Czech Republic experienced a currency crisis 
in 1997, and then rapid appreciation until about 2002.  
 
The fundamental challenge facing these transition countries is that their 
productivity growth is much higher than Western Europe’s. As already 
mentioned, productivity growth in the three Visegrad countries is 
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forecast at 9.5% for 2004, versus just 2.8% for the euro-zone. Belassa-
Samuelson tells us that under plausible assumptions, the real exchange 
rate must rise in countries with productivity growth in tradeables that is 
higher than that of their trading partners. This means that either their 
inflation rates must be above their trading partners’, or their nominal 
exchange rates must rise, or some combination of the two. Hence it is 
not surprising that the flakey four floaters are all struggling with 
inflation, rising exchange rates, or both.  
 
But why, you might ask, haven’t rising real exchange rates proved a 
problem for the six serial small peggers? Part of the answer is that, in 
the Baltics in particular, low inflation was endogenized early, even in 
the non-tradeables sector, as the result of their early and unambiguous 
currency boards. This has also been true of Bulgaria, which adopted a 
currency board in 1997 and has experienced remarkable low inflation in 
non-tradeables. Whether the experience of the small early-fixers can be 
taken as lesson for larger countries is debatable and beyond my scope in 
this short talk.  
 
In any case, the Visegrad countries are having trouble meeting the 
inflation and interest conditions for joining the euro, and some of them 
are having trouble floating even within the wide =/- 15% band. This has 
been the de jure band for ERM 2 to allow  the Italians and Spaniards to 
get back on the euro-accession wagon after their crises of 1992/93. But 
in mid-2003 Pedro Solbes, the EU Monetary Affairs Commissioner, 
startled putative accession countries by proclaiming that de facto the 
band expected within ERM II will be much narrower, presumably the  
+/- 2.25% that was required before 1992. Hence the question of the 
band has become contentious and controversial  
 
States of controversy 
 
Indeed, several aspects of the route to adoption of the euro are currently 
controversial in Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Bratislava, Ljubljana etc., 
and even, soto voce, in Brussels and Frankfurt. Here are six of the most 
controversial:  
 
• Should the three best EU countries or the over-all EU average 
dictate inflation reference levels for inflation and long term 
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interest rates? If the latter, reference levels would, of course, be 
higher.  
 
• Should +/- 2.25% or +/- 15% be allowable as a band for exchange 
rate fluctuations?  
 
 
• More generally, should ERM II relax its inflation ceilings and/or 
relax nominal exchange stabilization to allow real exchange rates 
to appreciate as productivity catches up to the EU?  
 
• Does the European Central Bank ever contemplate acting as a 
centralized lender of last resort? If so, might it not also want to 
centralize banking supervision? 
 
• Bad bank debt is particularly problematic in the Czech Republic, 
in Slovakia and in Poland. Is it manageable at country levels? 
 
• Should the new member states with currency boards abandon 
them before joining ERM II? This would seem pointless unless re-
alignment of parity with the euro is contemplated. But how 
rapidly should the countries that currently float “tighten up”, and 
then at what parity rate should they lock in to the euro?  
 
Tradeoffs, dilemmas and challenges 
 
In summary, the euro-accession countries, particularly the four “flakey 
large floaters”, face tradeoffs, dilemmas and challenges.  
 
How much flexibility? As already suggested, among the large floaters a 
continued history of volatility against the euro implies that transitional 
restructuring and/or volatile capital flows may necessitate continued 
flexibility for several years.  
 
What central parity, and when? The central parity consistent with 
current account balance may be higher in, say, 2007, than now, 
especially if new member states are constrained by the Maastricht 
criteria to inflation rates no higher than the lowest three EMU 
countries. The EU Commissioner’s declaration last year of preference 
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for a narrow ERM II exchange rate band could force countries to make 
a premature choice of parity. 
 
An additional consideration in the choice between fixing parity now or 
later is that secular growth in capital inflows can cause real exchange 
rate appreciation, again via inflation or via nominal appreciation. This 
can also delay the date for fixing parity. 
 
In both cases (catch-up productivity growth and rapid capital flows), 
the parity rate consistent with current account balance is a moving 
target. A final complication is that the medium term parity rate is not 
necessarily one that is consistent with current account balance. On the 
contrary, continuing current account deficits are appropriate as long as 
productivity growth and returns on capital are above EMU and world 
averages. 
 
In any case, to put the parity dilemma in a nutshell, premature 
exchange rate stability may cause excessive current account deficits (in 
case of undervaluation), or excessive inflation (in case of overvaluation).    
 
Fiscal challenges  
 
I have not yet mentioned fiscal deficits. The brutal reality is that even 
were they to resolve their inflation, interest rate and exchange rate 
stability problems, the big four floaters could not the euro in the near 
future without severe and politically painful fiscal retrenchment.  In 
recent years fiscal deficits have actually widened in Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia and are typically over 5%. Even in 
Cyprus and Malta, deficits are above 3% of GDP. These deficits may 
prove more intransigent than in Western Europe, given long socialist 
traditions and the consequent likelihood of continued pressure for 
government spending on both infrastructure and transfer payments. 
Moreover, Balassa/Samuelson effects cause the relative price of non-




And not only may these deficits prove intransigent in the long run, they 
may be inflexible in the short run. Given a reluctance to cut spending, 
the scope for contractionary counter-cyclical fiscal policy may be more 
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limited in the Central and Eastern European Countries than in Western 
European countries like Ireland. In the opposite direction, the scope for 
stimulatory fiscal policy will be limited if the Growth and Stability 
Pact’s 3% deficit ceiling is imposed on these countries, and enforced.  
 
Next to adopt the euro? 
 
Finally, a few words about who might next adopt the euro, beyond just 
the ten new members of the EU. 
 
Bulgaria and Romania hope to join the EU in 2007. Croatia has just 
applied, and Macedonia is also on track.  All four could, in principle, 
adopt the euro by 2010, although Croatia and Macedonia will accede to 
both the EU later than Bulgaria and Romania. Turkey has had official 
EU-candidate status since 1999, but is not expected to be admitted until 
at least 2015.  
 
Several countries could unofficially euroize: that is, withdraw their 
domestic currency and adopt the euro without permission from Brussels 
or Frankfurt. Kosovo and Montenegro have already done so. Bosnia 
and Serbia could be next, especially if they hold out no hope to join the 
EU in the foreseeable future and therefore have no particular incentive 
to jump through hoops devised by Brussels and Frankfurt. And what 
about countries that may never need to please Brussels, countries like 
Armenia, Georgia, or Kazakhstan?    
 
It is not, however, crystal clear that abandonment of local currencies is 
typically in the cards. Although many if not most countries in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia already use the euro or the dollar informally 
for transactions and/or store of value purposes (Feige & Dean, 2004), 
the number of national currencies in the region has multiplied over the 
last decade with the creation of new nation states (Pomfret, 2003), and 
for many of them – Ukraine for example – their currency is a symbol of 
the national independence they were so long denied.   It is not clear that 
widespread formal dollarization, euroization, or currency union is likely 







Self-declared Intentions to Join European Monetary Union 
 
• Cyprus: “2007 despite recent fiscal slippages” (Pre-Accession 
Economic Programme [PEP] 2003) 
• Czech Republic: “as soon as plausible economic conditions have 
been created” (PEP 2003) [More concrete statements by CZ point 
to 2009 – 2010] 
• Estonia: “as soon as 2006” (PEP 2003) 
• Hungary: “1 January 2008” (PEP 2003) 
• Latvia: “earliest … 1 January 2008” (PEP 2003) 
• Lithuania: “Realistically … start of 2007” (Governor Sarkinas, 
March 2003) 
• Malta: “second half of 2007 or Jan 2008 latest” (Governor 
Bonello, Feb 2004) 
• Poland: “only when macro conditions make it possible … [given 
projected gov’t deficits] … 2008 or 2009” (PEP 2003) 
• Slovakia “earliest realistic target 2008” (Strategy of the Slovak 
Republic for adoption of the euro, June 2003) 
• Slovenia “Both the Bank and the Government … judge … it will 
be possible at the beginning of 2007” (Joint  programme of the 
Slovenian Government and Bank of Slovenia for ERM II entry and 
adoption of the euro, November 2003) 
 
• In short, declarations of the new member states range from 2006 
(Estonia) to Jan 2010 (Czech Rep.) 
• Most optimistic (2007 or earlier) are Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Malta, and Slovenia 
• Least optimistic (2008 or later) are Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Latvia, Poland and Slovakia  




• Cyprus: De jure: Peg to euro with +/- 15% band. De facto: 
Narrow range of fluctuation 
• Czech Republic: Managed float; 2 – 4% inflation target by end 
2005 
• Estonia: CBA fix to euro since 1992 
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• Hungary: Peg to euro with +/- 15% band; inflation target of 3 – 
5%  by end 2005 
• Latvia: Peg to SDR with +/- 1% band 
• Lithuania: CBA fix to dollar in 1994, then to euro in February 
2002. 
• Malta: Peg to basket of 70& euro, 30% dollar and pound sterling 
• Poland: Free float with inflation target of 1.5 – 3.5% 
• Slovakia: Managed float: hybrid strategy;  implicit infl. targeting 
• Slovenia: Crawling band with monetary, real, external and 
financial indicators 
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